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multiple interpretations of the past is certainly valuable, but giving 
up on methodological guidelines by which to exploit t~em f~r 
understanding and insight is harmful. It would be_unfortu~ate indeed 1f 
such muddle were allowed to compromise the promise of his contextual 
approach which, I suspect, will be realised in direct relation to use of 
individualistic method. 
In closin~ I will add that Reading the Past is a difficult book to 
interpret. On ?~umerous issues, one finds Dr. Hodder's viewpoints accom- · 
oanied bv qualifiers that amount to counterviews. It is not easy to know 
where he stands. Even his position on relativism, perhaps the most 
crucial in the entire book, is not clear: 
An open re lativi sm aooears at first to be the only 
solution , wherebv 'anythinit goes.' Certainly there 
a re some attractive aspects of this solution, if it 
allows greater debate between different viewpoints 
and a fuller involvement of archaeology in contem-
porarv social and political issues. Yet most 
archaeoloitists feel that this solution is too 
extreme. Most feel that some interpretations of the 
past are not as good as others, that not everything 
can be said with equal integrity. (p. 169) 
have shot the best of my arsenal at Dr. Hodder, and deli berately 
forged the ammunition to expose its sharpest edges. I strongly 
recormiend reading on , where Dr. Hodder will fire in return. 
Notes 
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READING BELL READING 'READING THE PAST' 
Ian Hodder 
I would like to start by considering some of the hard objective 
evidence that Jim Bell uses against me. At the end of his review 
article he quotes from o.169 of Reading the ~~. Bell uses this 
evidence to show that my position on relativism is not clear and that on 
numerous issues · I provide confusing sets of qualifiers and counterviews. 
.4.Iso, in the context of Bell's overall review, the quote, referring as 
it does to relativism, aooears to substantiate his assertion that my 
position on relativism is oerhaps the most crucial in the entire book. 
My book is a real thing (in the same way that archaeological data 
are real). And yet in readin~ Bell's reading of my book I realise that 
he often did not see what I wrote or what I thought I wrote. The book 
is real but different readers give it different realities. For example, 
I think that it is unambiguouslv clear in the context of adjacent 
paragraphs in the book that the phrase in the first part of the quote , 
"an open relativism aopears at first to be the only solution", is not my 
position. Indeed, in the context of the book as a whole; relativism is 
one '-ism' that I do not directly discuss at all! If the 'evidence' of 
the index is anything to go by, p.169 is the only place in the book 
where the word relativism is used. Far from being central to my 
account, relativism is entirely peripheral. On the other hand, I think 
it is unambiguously clear in the context of the book that I agree with 
the last sentence in the quote Bel 1 provides: "Most feel that some 
interpretations of the past are not as good as others, that not 
everything can be said with equal integrity". Indeed, the sentence 
which follows this on p.169 of Reading lli Past suggests that "the 
contemoorary social basis of our reconstructions of the past does not 
necessitate a lack of validity for those reconstructions~ At the top 
of the following page, I say that "in my view it is poss ible critically 
to evaluate past and present contexts in r el ation to each other, so as 
to achieve a better understanding of both". 
These statements certainly do not read like relativism as defined 
bv Bell. For him, relativi sm is the view that any interoretation is as 
plausible as any other , that there a r e no rational guidelines for 
assessing theories. It is seen as an irrational view of theory. He 
accepts that the second (and cen tral) part of my book is not relativi s t , 
but goes on to claim that I am a relativist despite the above quotes, 
despite the fac t that I only use the word once and desp ite the fact that 
when I do use the word it i s clearly disapproved of. Why doe s Bell 
claim that I am relativi s t in the face of all the evidence? I think the 
answer is that when we read a book (or archaeological evidence) it is 
not a passive process of absorbing information. Rather, we read in 
a creative way, putting meaning on and into the data. 
(Archaeological Review from Cambridge 6:1 (1987]) 
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A further example clarifies the ooint. Bell divides my book into 
three sections. I certainly did not write the book in three sections 
and I never conceived of it in that way. There is no 'objective' 
evidence of three sections. Indeed I had the rather naive hope that the 
book had an overall unity, or that it )lloUld be seen as having a 
continuous flow , building up from beginning to end. If forced to divide 
it into sections I would have said that each chapter was a section or 
that the book had two overall sections -- a critical review of existing 
aoproaches and then my contextual and post-proc~ssual ~chem~. I_ think 
the reason for Bell's perception of three sections lies 1n his own 
interests and academic strategy. He clearly believes that it is 
oossible to separate theory from data and to test/refute theory against 
data. Thus he separates my contextual method which appears to him to be 
hard , refutationist and scientific, from what he sees as my 'fall from 
grace' in the 'third' section where I examine the social basis of 
archaeohri cal theory, method and data. Be 11 's own description of the 
'data' in my book demonstrates the theory-laden nature of data . 
New Archaeologists were distinctive in that they were not concerned 
with self-critical , reflexive analysis . They did not consider it 
necessarv to exmaine the social basis of their ideas. This was not 
because they thought that their ideas did not have a contemporary social 
basis . Rather it was because they took the view that Bell retains that, 
wherever one's ideas came from, they can be tested objectively against 1 
the data . The link between their view and the study of process within 
New Archaeology is very strong and needs to be re-asserted in view of 
Bell's claims to the contrary. It is no accident that Binford 
scornfully used the term 'palaeopsychology' and that he and other 
orocessual archaeologists always refused to admit interpretive, emic 
approaches in archaeology. The study of behavioural, materialist 
aoproaches was intimately linked to the belief that science should 
progress through testing theory against hard data. It was only the 
behavioural and material world that allowed theories to be tested 
against the obs ervable, measurable data. The New Archaeologists forged 
a log ical and necessary link be tween pos i tivi sm and the s tudy of 
systemic proces ses. "The meaning which explanation has within a 
scientific frame of r e ference is s imply the demonstration of a cons tant 
articulation of var iables with i n a s ystem and the measur ement of the 
concomitant variability among the variables within the sys t em. 
Process ua l change in one variabl e can thus be shown to relate in a 
oredict abl e and quantifiabl e way to chan ges in othe r variable s " 
(Binford 1972, o.21). 
As a r esult , New Archaeolog i s t s we re blind to their own s ocial and 
oolitical pos itions. Since Bell's philosophica l position is in my vi ew 
close to that of many New Ar chaeologists (although not the ex treme law-
and- order brigade), he al so oresents political views a s if they were 
~oolitical. For example, in a number of places he di s cusse s 
structurali sm and Marx ism as if they ar e overly ideological, but he does 
not turn the same criticism on systems theory, oositivism and 
r e futationism. He talk s of s ome views o f the oast a s abuses or 
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miscarriages of science and rationality . Certainly there are many 
examples. But on what grounds can it be claimed that systems theory and 
philosoohical oositions are not oolitical? For a Critical Theorist, 
systems theory is certainly an ideology. I have discussed it as an 
'ideologv of control' - - a means by which a liberal intellectual world 
can set itself uo as providing a politically neutral method of social 
control (Hodder 1984). The claimed seoaration of fact from theory has 
exactly the same social and ool i tical consequences. It places the 
scientist outside, vet necessary for, society. Bell claims that in 
European prehistory the classical diffusionist theory was refuted by 
radiocarbon dating, thus leading to systems theory: old theory was 
refuted and new theory was introduced as part of the scientific proces s. 
In my view this is simply wrong. Certainly some asoects of t he old 
diffusionist theories were shown (for many , but not all, archaeo-
logists) to be invalid when confronted with radiocarbon. But in f a ct 
diffusion remains, and is a valid explanation for cultural 
similarities in prehistoric Europe. The diffusion may now go in other 
directions, and it may now have different names (peer polity inter-
action, or world systems mode l). But the concept of diffusion was not 
itself refuted at all. Rather, archaeologists began to be unhappy 
with the concept of diffusion. This change of attitude was much more 
closely associated with wider social and cultural changes than it was 
with any particular confrontation with the data. In the post-
colonial era in Europe, indigenous development became increasing ly 
emphasised and more highly regarded, Perhaps more important , the 
expansion of science and high technology, the development of comouters 
and systems terminology could hardly have passed archaeology by. For 
cultural, social and funding purooses it was important to appear 
scientific. Systems theory was introduced and diffusionism declined. 
The science of radiocarbon was brought in to orove the point. 
Refusal to explore the social and political dimensions of 
archaeological enquiry in New Archaeological and in Bell's accounts is 
clear. It is associated with a belief in the separation of fact from 
theory. I do not mind whe ther one call s this separati on positi v i s m, 
refutationism or wha tever. In arguing over whe ther the New Archaeology 
wa s positivi s t or refutationi s t, it seems to me tha t there is a danger 
of following Bell into a philosophi ca l debate over terms rather than 
di s cus s ing issues, What i s important i s that the separii.tion between 
fa C? t and theory was made (whatever one call s it), As a result 
archaeology refused to be s elf-r eflective and it ther e for e r emained an 
immature discipline. Also it became more and more concerned with 
method. The 'bi g questions' were less f requentl y asked a s 
archaeologi s ts became more and more concerned with rigorous method that 
would es tabli sh their scientific status. In my vi ew the r esults of the 
New Archaeology have become increas ingly negative . We are now in a 
per i od of mindl ess methodology. You only have to look at the pages of 
American Antiquity over recent years , or at the sessions of the Society 
for American Archaeology to see this. The dominant centre of the 
discioline i s absorbed in site formation proces ses , middle range theory , 
methods for distinguishing foraging and collecting systems and so on. 
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The response to this situation should not be a retreat into total 
historical subjectivity. Bell reads my book from a position that 
rigidly separates subjective and objective approaches. It is from that 
position that his difficulties and the general impasse in archaeology 
derive. In Reading the Past I tried to argue that the data are both 
subjective and objective. It has always seemed t o me that two 
contradictory views are equally true. On the one hand it clearly is the 
case that archaeological data constrain what we can say about the past, 
There is a hard reality there and we have to fit our theories and 
oerceotions around it. On the other hand, it is equally clear that we 
cannot perceive or measure the oast without giving meaning to it. These 
meanings are oartly constructed in the social present. 
I therefore argued that archaeology involves evaluating data in 
relation to two contexts -- the past and the present. The data are 
both obiective and subjective but unlike the claims of New Archaeo-
logists, I argued that these two components cannot be separated. The 
data can be carefully studied in relation to Past and 
present contextual relationships . Bell is incorrect to think that I 
separate contextual archaeology (the second of his three sections) from 
a consideration of contemporary social contexts and from the 'power' of 
science (the third section). The definition of past contexts is 
itself a theoretical enterprise. My doing of contextual archaeology is 
closely linked to my political views about the nature of society. 
We can see the total integration of the subjective and the 
objective in all aspects of daily life. We cannot think except through 
objective categories . We learn to understand the world through 
experience of it . The views that 'matter precedes thought' and that 
'thought precedes matter' are equally viable. Can archaeologists not 
transcend the fixed dichotomy between objective and subjective, and the 
related dichotomies between positivism and relativism, materialism and 
idealism? The archaeological past is just another realm of experience 
by which we come to define ourselves in the pr esent. If we simply 
/ 
imoose the oresent on the past uncritically, as was done by New 
Ar chaeo logists and traditional archaeologists, we can never learn about 
) 
ourselves. All that information on library shelves quietly becomes 
useless. But if we inte rpret the oast critically in relation to the 
oresent, then archaeological knowledge contributes directly to the 
oresent. It is by ooening UP a dialogue between the past and the 
oresent that we come to know ourselves better. 
In this response to Bell's criticisms I have argued that he has 
read my text through tinted glasses. This is unavoidable and it is what 
ar~haeologists do in interpreting the past . In arguing with him about 
his r eview, our different social perceptions of the world are clarified 
and objectified. Such debate and cont r oversy should be the stuff of 
archaeological enquiry, since it is through that debate that we come to 
have a fuller understanding of our and others' viewpoints. And it is 
through that understanding, as long as it is critically developed, that 
we can play a fuller part in socie ty. 
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do not want to argue that my interpretation of 'my own' book is 
right and that Bell is wrong. The book is di vor~ed fr_om me. Its 
meaning does not deoend on the author but on the reading of 1t that is 
given. I do not wish for any authority in relation to the text. To 
control its meaning would be to control readin~s of it. That is not my 
concern. But neither am I slioping back into subjectivity and 
relativism. To read the book is to give an objective reality to one's 
thoughts, perceptions and assumptions. It is only through that 
objectivity that our subjectivities can be argued, fought over or 
transformed, 
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